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Abstract
Last year saw the 20th anniversary edition of JECP, and in the introduction to the philoso-
phy section of that landmark edition, we posed the question: apart from ethics, what is the
role of philosophy ‘at the bedside’? The purpose of this question was not to downplay the
significance of ethics to clinical practice. Rather, we raised it as part of a broader argument
to the effect that ethical questions – about what we should do in any given situation – are
embedded within whole understandings of the situation, inseparable from our beliefs about
what is the case (metaphysics), what it is that we feel we can claim to know (epistemology),
as well as the meaning we ascribe to different aspects of the situation or to our perception
of it. Philosophy concerns fundamental questions: it is a discipline requiring us to examine
the underlying assumptions we bring with us to our thinking about practical problems.
Traditional academic philosophers divide their discipline into distinct areas that typically
include logic: questions about meaning, truth and validity; ontology: questions about the
nature of reality, what exists; epistemology: concerning knowledge; and ethics: how we
should live and practice, the nature of value. Any credible attempt to analyse clinical
reasoning will require us to think carefully about these types of question and the relation-
ships between them, as they influence our thinking about specific situations and problems.
So, the answers to the question we posed, about the role of philosophy at the bedside, are
numerous and diverse, and that diversity is illustrated in the contributions to this thematic
edition.
Introduction
Recent developments in UK health policy have focused public
attention on the relationship between health and social care, with
the government announcing ‘ground-breaking’ policies to increase
the integration of these aspects of care in the Manchester region
[1]. Despite serious disagreements about the practicality of this
initiative at the organizational level, the public debate thus far has
indicated broad support for greater integration [1], arguably sug-
gesting a developing consensus that medical, psychological and
social dimensions of health form an integrated whole, such that the
different aspects of care delivered under these labels should,
ideally, form part of a provision directed at the overall well-being
of the patient.
If this really is the current consensus, then it perhaps represents
a shift in thinking from models once regarded as mainstream, in
which health was primarily a biomedical concept and other uses of
the term were considered extensions of its core meaning [2–7]. But
whatever our view on such issues, and on the wider debate about
biomedicine and person-centred care, the very existence of this
debate in the public sphere (one involving local authorities, numer-
ous professional organizations, patient advocacy groups as well as
all the main political parties) reminds us of something important.
That is, questions about the conceptual boundaries of different
types of care, the scope of medical categories, the relationships
between appropriate forms of expertise with which we categorize
health problems and the appropriate methodologies to employ
when addressing them are by no means questions we can afford to
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bracket off as merely academic in nature, divorced from the con-
cerns of front-line practice. Discussions about the nature of health
and illness, which sources of knowledge are appropriate in under-
standing health problems and how we conceptualize evidence and
causality are indeed ‘academic’ in the sense that they require
serious intellectual attention, but they are not ‘merely’ academic:
our responses to them will determine how we approach the most
challenging choices facing health and social care in the immediate
and long-term future.
Last year saw the 20th anniversary edition of JECP, and in the
introduction to the philosophy section of that landmark edition, we
posed the question: apart from ethics, what is the role of philoso-
phy ‘at the bedside’ [8]? The purpose of this question was not to
downplay the significance of ethics to clinical practice. Rather, we
raised it as part of a broader argument to the effect that ethical
questions – about what we should do in any given situation – are
embedded within whole understandings of the situation, insepa-
rable from our beliefs about what is the case (metaphysics), what
it is that we feel we can claim to know (epistemology) as well as
the meaning we ascribe to different aspects of the situation or to
our perception of it. Philosophy concerns fundamental questions:
it is a discipline requiring us to examine the underlying assump-
tions we bring with us to our thinking about practical problems [9].
Traditional academic philosophers divide their discipline into dis-
tinct areas that typically include logic: questions about meaning,
truth and validity; ontology: questions about the nature of reality,
what exists; epistemology: concerning knowledge; and ethics: how
we should live and practice, the nature of value. Any credible
attempt to analyse clinical reasoning will require us to think care-
fully about these types of question and the relationships between
them, as they influence our thinking about specific situations and
problems.
So, the answers to the question we posed, about the role of
philosophy at the bedside, are numerous and diverse, and that
diversity is illustrated in the contributions to this thematic edition.
In what follows we present a series of insightful discussions about
the nature of health, disease, care, reasoning and knowledge in
clinical practice. Authors consider the relationships between sci-
entific explanations of disorder and human experience, the thera-
peutic implications of different ways of ‘framing’ our experiences
of illness, the relationship between economic and medical thinking
and the use of analogies in clinical reasoning. Throughout they
attempt to develop clear implications of their arguments for the
solution of the problems of practice. Included in this edition is a
selection of papers from a recent meeting of the Association for the
Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry (AAPP), addressing
questions where the attempt to map the boundaries and understand
the conceptual overlaps between science, evaluation, experience
and reasoning have become particularly urgent and challenging.
Diseases and medical categories
Discussions of the nature of health, disease and diagnosis date
back to the ancients [10], but the contemporary philosophical
discussion of these crucial questions owes a lot to the work of late
20th century theorists including Christopher Boorse and his many
critics [2,3,11,12]. This section opens with a paper by Marco
Azevedo that proposes a conception of health as a ‘clinic-
epidemiological concept’ [13]. Although heavily influenced by
Boorse’s biostatistical theory, which he describes as ‘the best
approach’ to defining health in the philosophy of medicine, as a
practising physician, Azevedo takes issue with Boorse’s treatment
of health as ‘a theoretical concept’. The view of health as ‘a
species normal functional ability’ grounds our understanding of
health in ‘normal physiology’, but ‘this is not what physicians
mean by health’. If, instead, we understand health as ‘a practical
clinical concept’ then health is not ‘the mere absence of disease’,
because ‘diseases that do not increase patients’ morbi-mortality
and disability indexes are not incompatible with health’. So on
Azevedo’s pragmatic approach, health is ‘best described as the
state of absence of chronic diseases or disabilities’ and he recom-
mends this as ‘the best description of what physicians actually
think about health within medical practices’.
Drawing on extensive empirical data, Andrew Edgar, Celia
Kitzinger and Jenny Kitzinger describe and analyse the categories
employed by medical professionals and lay carers (typically family
members) when conceptualizing the subjective states of patients
suffering with Chronic Disorders of Consciousness (CDoC) [14].
They note that these different parties employ quite different inter-
pretive frameworks to address the most pressing epistemological
problem such patients present: how to ‘gain an insight into the
patient’s state of consciousness merely from observation of their
physical movements – the flicker of an eyelid, thrashing or kicking’.
Both frameworks may reveal aspects of the truth about the patient’s
situation, but they note that the differences between them can ‘lead
to ruptures in communication between medical professionals and
relatives’. They conclude that ‘an increased self-consciousness of
the framing assumptions being made will facilitate communication
and enrich understanding of CDoCs’.
The need to be explicit about underlying assumptions which
frame our thinking about medical conditions is highlighted in the
paper by Alexandra Parvan – although her concern is not primarily
with the assumptions of physicians, nurses or family carers, but
with the way that patients with chronic conditions conceptualize
their own situation, and in particular the ontological status of their
own condition [15]. Parvan notes that ‘the receipt of diagnosis and
medical care can give patients the sense that they are ontologically
diminished, or less of a human’ and this ‘may prompt them to seek
ontological restoration’ by treating the disease (or associated
experience of harm) as ‘a thing that exists per se’. She labels this
tendency the ‘substantialization’ of disease (or harm) and argues
that ‘substantialization can generate a “hybrid symptom,” consist-
ing in patterns of exercising agency which may predispose to
non-adherence’. Parvan is fully convinced that this gives a crucial
role to philosophy ‘at the bedside’ as practitioners may need to
give ‘metaphysical care’ by enabling patients to reframe their
thinking about the status of their conditions/deficiencies.
In his commentary, the clinician Victor Cellarius assesses the
therapeutic potential in Parvan’s concept of ‘metaphysical care’
[16]. Cellarius agrees that, although persons may reflect deeply on
their experiences and situation, ‘the metaphysical commitments
underlying these experiences may be left unexamined’. But he
raises a number of pressing questions about how practitioners might
use this insight to benefit patients. These include concerns about
how we assess the significance of what Parvan labels ‘external’ as
opposed to ‘internal’ factors prompting the substantialization of
disease, how we weigh the benefits against the harms of
substantialization in particular cases and ‘how we evaluate the
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degree to which the person has reframed their metaphysical stance’.
We need to be able to determine what sort of truth claims should be
made for the ideas connected with substantialization if we are to
justify attempting to get patients to address and indeed change their
underlying commitments. Cellarius stresses he is not treating these
questions as rebuttals of an approach proposed in a ‘purposefully
exploratory’ paper, and argues that an empirical investigation must
be the next step in integrating this approach into practice.
This section closes with a paper by Nicholas Binney that also
makes a plea for the importance of metaphysics at the bedside
[17]. He cautions against the uncritical acceptance of a monist
ontology in medicine, in which disease classification is performed
exclusively according to a single classification system (nosology).
Binney traces this thinking back to the early modern nosologist
Thomas Sydenham, who modelled disease taxonomy after plant
taxonomy. Drawing on the work of John Dupre, who criticizes the
use of a single classification system in plant biology, Binney
makes the analogous case for a pluralist disease ontology. Using
illustrations from the diagnosis of heart failure, he argues convinc-
ingly that medics prepared to think carefully about their ontologi-
cal assumptions are better prepared to capture the different aspects
of their patients’ problems, and so to care for their patients better,
than those who fail to take metaphysics seriously.
The care of the patient
As Binney’s paper suggests, there is a relationship between the
ability of our methods and classificatory systems to capture the
diverse aspects of patients’ problems, and the quality of patient
care. Anna Luise Kirkengen and Eline Thornqvist note that the
movement towards personalized medicine (PM) developed as an
attempt to overcome the limitations of evidence-based medicine
(EBM) in accommodating clinical complexity and human indi-
viduality [18]. However, they argue that both these approaches to
medical practice place too high a priority on quantitative data. As
a result, they both miss out on the social context and lived experi-
ence of illness, and can therefore neglect what really matters to
patients. Furthermore, this narrow focus can lead to harm. This
point is driven home through the use of the ‘sickness history’ of a
woman named Judith Janson, whose experiences with the health
care system, although extensive, were largely negative because
they routinely failed to address her real health needs. EBM and PM
alike fail to address adequately issues of multi-morbidity leading
to poly-pharmacy, complex chronic disorders and the roots of
illness.
Addressing specifically the problems of caring for patients
during challenging clinical encounters, James Marcum reveals that
medical literature is deficient in accounting for the nature and
origins of such problems, which tend to frustrate and demoralize
clinicians as well as patients [19]. Drawing insight from a recon-
structed clinical case, the author suggests that these encounters do
not signify a medical disorder. Rather, they indicate a type of
existential dysfunction whose origins lie not only in patients but
also in clinicians and health systems. Marcum further draws on his
clinical case to suggest revisions to two models – CALMER and
REBELS – for managing challenging encounters more effectively
than at present.
Dignity is a sine qua non of patient care, yet the literature on
dignity is sparse. Kathleen Galvin and Les Todres thoughtfully
address this concern in their paper honouring the complexity of the
concept of ‘dignity’. [20] Through phenomenological thinking,
they first consider ‘the essence of dignity and its ontological roots’.
They reconcile pure (essential) and interpretive (existential)
notions of phenomenology, then frame dignity within health and
social care as a coherent set of seven interrelated kinds that may
rupture at different levels of intensity and range, and be restored.
This framework informs practical ways to affect this restoration,
and specific debates about dignity within philosophical and pro-
fessional literatures.
As the movement towards person-centred care increasingly
emphasizes the status of patients and professionals as members of
broader communities and ways of life that encompass the clinical
encounter, Sandro Tsang discusses the ability of health economics
to enhance medicine [21]. Her paper takes on directly the claim that
economics and medicine are ‘philosophically incompatible’ disci-
plines because conventional (neoclassical) economics assumes
models of human motivation (based on self-interest) that are incom-
patible with altruism, and consequently with patient care and
medical professionalism’s principle of the primacy of patient
welfare. Drawing on the ideas of economist Kenneth Arrow about
the relationship between trust, reciprocity and the efficient use of
communal resources, Tsang uses the term ‘arrow physician’ to
characterize ‘a humanistic carer who has a concern for the patient
and acts on the best available evidence with health equity in mind’.
She hopes that the development of a shared professional language
can motivate and enable all physicians within a trusting institutional
environment, including polycentric governance, to practice medi-
cine as arrow physicians.
The conceptual boundaries between ‘patient-centred care’,
public health and ‘patient empowerment’ are the central concerns
of the paper by Ignaas Devisch and Stijn Vanheule [22]. They note
that the rhetoric of public health discourse emphasizes such ideas
as empowerment and self-management – driven by the bioethical
principle of respect for autonomy – to imply a significant shift
from earlier, more paternalistic conceptions of patient care.
Drawing on the ideas of philosopher Michel Foucault, they argue
that patients have been taught to internalize the medical prescrip-
tions that used to be advanced paternalistically. As an example, the
‘healthy lifestyle’ prescribed to all citizens is fairly strict and
specific (don’t smoke!), yet it is seen as an individual’s respon-
sibility (and free choice) to pursue this objective. Avoiding ‘risky
behaviour’ becomes something governed from within. Perhaps,
the authors suggest, we have not taken freedom seriously so much
as created ways for people to feel free while acting according to
the wishes of those in power. Taking a somewhat more cynical
view of the role of economics than Tsang, these authors regard the
role of public health as sustaining an economically productive
population via the application of statistical knowledge, with scant
concern for individual values and divergence.
Rethinking medical epistemology
Such questions, about value and diversity, care, altruism, empow-
erment and paternalism, are ethical and political in nature. But
these questions, and the associated problems about ontology and
classification that formed the main focus of papers in the first
section, are all intimately linked to questions about knowledge,
validity and justification. Questions about how we know and how
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we can demonstrate the truth of the claims we make can be asked
of any claim we advance about medical ontology and good prac-
tice, and it is to the fundamental issues of clinical epistemology
that the papers in the third section turn.
Sophie van Baalen and Mieke Boon argue that EBM does not
provide sufficient resources for physicians to engage in proper
clinical reasoning [23]. In particular, the evidence and the decision
support methods provided by EBM are unable to support the kind
of epistemic responsibility that doctors must take for their diag-
nostic and treatment decisions. They provide an alternative
approach to understanding what kinds of information are required
to enable doctors to take epistemic responsibility, describing the
function of such knowledge as an ‘epistemic tool’ that is developed
in particular clinical situations in response to the needs of a par-
ticular patient, rather than viewing knowledge solely in terms of a
narrow conception of the objective facts and rule-based reasoning.
The problem of reasoning from general knowledge to particular
cases resurfaces again in the paper by Luis Flores [24]. Flores
explores the challenge of applying population-level effect sizes –
as probabilities – to particular patients: a problem which, he notes,
is highly vexing and unresolved in EBM. He discusses the extent
to which pragmatic randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and sub-
group analyses remedy the problem, and concludes that even effect
size estimates derived from highly representative and/or specific
samples are rarely directly applicable to the particular patient.
Instead, as a guiding principle, the probabilities of interest are the
probabilities given everything that is relevant at the time of the
decision, which will inevitably include details derived from other
kinds of (non-trial) evidence.
Benjamin Chin-Yee and Ross Upshur offer insights from RG
Collingwood’s philosophy of history for medical epistemology
[25]. Chin-Yee and Upshur trace the decline of the patient history
with the rise of biomedicine and EBM. They argue that
Collingwood’s philosophy of history provides a more inclusive
concept of evidence that embraces narrative knowledge, and thus
resituates the patient history at the centre of medical practice, in
line with contemporary medical movements that emphasize narra-
tive thinking and patient centredness.
A distinct set of issues about clinical reasoning is raised in the
paper by Ramesh Prasad, which discusses the use of creative
analogies in medicine as a vehicle for revolutionary progress [26].
Conservative analogies involve importing a technology from one
domain into a similar domain, as when the use of steroid immu-
nosuppression for kidney transplantation was imported from rheu-
matology, where it played a similar role in autoimmune disease. In
contrast, in creative analogy a new technology is created in one
domain through analogy with another technology used in a dis-
similar domain. Prasad describes the development of domino
kidney transplantation (through analogy with the game of domi-
noes) as an example of this promising mode of discovery.
Matt Boyd investigates the limits of root cause analysis (RCA)
as a method for identifying the causes of adverse events in medi-
cine [27]. He suggests that closer attention to the insights of
philosophers of science, particularly those working on causation
and explanation, will help to improve RCA. Although RCA cur-
rently identifies the factors that may have led to an adverse event,
it does not have an adequately fine-tuned method for sorting
among those factors. Given that sorting among these factors is
important, since we do not want to take action against every
possible contributing factor when some of them may not be
harmful at all, this sort of fine-tuning would be a real advance in
the field.
The paper by Stephen Tyreman shifts the focus again to a
discussion of uncertainty, truth and trust [28]. He argues that
uncertainty for practitioners may be about enhancing theoretical
knowledge, but for patients it is about ‘knowing how to act in a
taken-for-granted and largely unconscious way in a world that has
become uncertain’ because ‘the main tool of action, the human
body, no longer functions with the certainty it once had’. The paper
in some ways evokes the one by Parvan [15] in that it proposes a
role for practitioners in helping patients frame their situation,
although in Tyreman’s case the goal is not to combat
substantialization but to recognize ‘the uncertainty that has
emerged in the patient’s “habitation” and to reassure them’ by
restoring confidence in the body so they can act with certainty.
Abdi Sanati draws on Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic
injustice in order to analyse the problems that arise when assessing
the claims of patients who suffer from delusions [29]. In particular,
he says that these patients often encounter testimonial injustice,
which occurs when prejudice leads us to consider a speaker to be
less than credible. He presents two illustrative cases in which
patients who suffer from a delusional disorder make true claims
that are wrongly considered to be delusions. He argues that these
cases should not be understood as ‘incidental’ cases of epistemic
injustice, but rather show that, because patients with delusions do
make claims that appear irrational, bizarre and incomprehensible,
it is all too easy to conclude that any unusual claim that they make
is therefore a delusion. Because such cases of epistemic injustice
undermine patients’ status as knowers, they are stigmatizing as
well as a threat to the relationship between patients and health care
providers. This important paper again illustrates the overlapping
nature of claims about knowledge and uncertainty, judgement,
evidence, argument and rhetoric, reason, ethics and politics in
practical debate, setting the scene for the discussions of the
ensuing section.
AAPP annual meeting: conceptual
and philosophical aspects of
clinical reasoning
The papers included in this section arose from the 26th annual
meeting of the AAPP, held 3–4 May 2014 in New York City. The
AAPP (est. 1989) is an organization developed to promote inter-
disciplinary research, educational initiatives and graduate training
programmes in philosophy and psychiatry. The annual meeting
brings together a range of disciplines encompassing psychiatry,
philosophy, psychology, social work and other disciplines in
humanities. The 2014 meeting focused on conceptual and philo-
sophical aspects of clinical reasoning. The breadth of this topic is
nicely illustrated by the papers included in this thematic issue.
The conceptual and practical challenges involved in an interdis-
ciplinary gathering such as this are fundamental to the philosophy
of psychiatry more generally: namely, identifying connections
between theory and practice and finding common ground among
differing conceptual frameworks to begin a conversation. Given the
heterogeneity in background and expertise represented, the annual
meeting prioritizes explanatory pluralism. This is evident in the six
papers selected here, which present a wide range of concerns.
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Clinical reasoning is at once ubiquitous and understudied.
Despite being a psychological process that clinicians engage with
on a daily basis, it is a process that remains poorly characterized
both methodologically and pedagogically. As a phenomenon it
runs the risk of being generalized to the point of meaninglessness,
or colloquialized to the ‘I know it when I see it’ of Justice Stewart.1
In his book How Doctors Think [30], Jerome Groopman discusses
a range of intuitive heuristics (as well as logical fallacies)
employed on the medical wards for better or worse, and identifies
how these heuristics are in play within seconds of assessing a
patient. Groopman offers many examples as to how this reflexive
use of heuristics leads to poor clinical decision making and bad
outcomes. Clinical reasoning as a topic of interest receives atten-
tion when it breaks down, or works suboptimally. At the same
time, Groopman bemoans the rise of EBM approaches as being
overly mechanistic, rigid and woefully inadequate at characteriz-
ing the individual nuances of a given patient. This tension between
evidence-based approaches (and the proceduralized decision-
making processes involved) and the less well-characterized
appeals to clinician experience and expertise (and associated intui-
tive approaches to decision making) is a thread that runs through
this discussion.
Although the possibility of medical error is relevant to a discus-
sion of clinical reasoning, there are good reasons to try to under-
stand clinical reasoning above and beyond the avoidance of bad
clinical outcomes. Groopman’s book, for all its rich anecdotal
examples, does not help us identify when heuristics are useful and
when they are not, the best direction being the passed-down,
inverted advice of a mentor: ‘Don’t just do something, stand
there’. Certainly taking pause given the inherent irrationality of
much decision making is worthy advice – inaction may very well
be prudent at times. But at a certain point we must act. As has been
suggested elsewhere [31] perhaps a more apt title might have been
How Doctors Think They Think. So how do we translate this
process of clinical reasoning into action and how do we justify this
form of knowledge (to ourselves, to patients, to peers) so as to
move forward in ethically, clinically and scientifically justified
fashion? How should we assess and account for the various and
competing interests that come to bear on decision making and
influence this translation from clinical reasoning to action? These
interests may range from pharmaceutical marketing, insurance
reimbursement and DSM classification changes to issues of
countertransference in the therapist/client relationship.
Groopman’s book draws heavily on Kahneman’s two system
theories of decision making [30]. System 1, per Kahneman’s model,
is fast, heuristic-based, intuitive and largely unconscious – useful in
quick appraisal but often resulting in misdiagnosis. System 2, in
contrast, is the slow, deliberate, analytical and energy-demanding
mode of reasoning. It is useful in deductive problem solving and yet
fatigable (one is well advised to schedule their medical appoint-
ments – mental health related or otherwise – in the early part of the
day). Both systems are practically useful in clinical reasoning in
different circumstances and there is good reason to believe that
these two systems have discrete neuroanatomical substrates. And
yet the process occurring between the enunciation of presenting
symptoms and diagnosis and treatment prescription remains, in
large part, poorly characterized both in terms of what is occurring as
well as what should be occurring.
It remains unclear how to combine the experiential aspects of
clinical practice, with its traditional maxims and heuristics, with
more evidence-based approaches. Although EBM offers clear
direction for weighing varieties of evidence and interpreting data,
it often remains unclear how to apply resultant generalized guide-
lines in the unique, often highly idiosyncratic microclimate of an
individual who is incompletely characterized by study popula-
tions. There are also concerns that EBM cannot adequately
account for the way in which patient values figure into decision
making: concerns that have motivated an array of humanistic
approaches such as values-based medicine, patient-centred medi-
cine and narrative medicine. In psychiatric formulation this
pluralism is perhaps best embodied by the biopsychosocial formu-
lation that proposes to understand and represent illness in terms of
biological, psychological and social factors rather than fall into
simple biological reductionism. As has been pointed out by Nassir
Ghaemi and others [32], however, the biopsychosocial model is
not only trivially self-evident in the face of caring for an individual
patient, but it runs the risk of vacuous eclecticism in that a simple
rendition of possible explanatory models across theoretical
domains does not necessarily help us craft meaningful interven-
tions, identify the causal factors at play or draw meaningful con-
nections between those levels of causation.
The broad topic of clinical reasoning offers ecumenical appeal
to both analytic and continental philosophical traditions, as illus-
trated in this sampling of papers. There are metaphysical issues at
stake relating to the ontological assumptions of clinical inference.
What sort of ‘kinds’ are psychiatric diagnostic categories –
natural? sociocultural? looping? practical? What are the inherent
conceptual and practical limitations in using an operationalized
approach to classification such as the DSM 5 for the purpose of
diagnosis and clinical decision making? How do our modes of
clinical decision making differentially suggest stances in the phi-
losophy of science – realist, instrumentalist, constructive empiri-
cist or otherwise?
There are hermeneutic challenges in the examination of the
clinical dyad and the play of interpretation as well as phenomeno-
logical questions as to the relative weight to be placed on subjec-
tive patient experience and the utility of these data to clinical
diagnosis and treatment prescription. How is this hermeneutic
circle impacted by pharmaceutical influences on clinical decision
making and illness characterization?
There are relevant sociocultural questions regarding the social
construction of various diagnoses and modes of illness presenta-
tion and how this impacts the reasoning processes of individual
practitioners. There are existential questions surrounding the
applied meaning of symptomatology and downstream effects on
patient experience and clinical appraisal. And there are ethical
questions regarding the role of mental health service users in
defining illness and illness experience as well as defining the scope
of ethical practice.
Jonathan Bolton, with reference to CS Peirce, examines the
structure of clinical inference, in particular the role of abductive
reasoning (namely, inferring a case example given a result and a
rule) as a common and practically useful mode of clinical reason-
ing [33]. His paper not only provides good reason to believe that
1 The American Supreme Court judge who famously ‘explained’ his
system for the classification of ‘hard core pornography’ with this phrase in
the 1960s.
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this mode of reasoning is common when faced with diagnostic
uncertainty, but also that EBM’s prioritization of inductive reason-
ing misrepresents the fact that, particularly in mental health, many
presenting clinical scenarios are underspecified in terms of infor-
mational content. Among other interesting implications, Bolton’s
argument suggests that clinical reasoning relies on variable meth-
odologies depending on the timeline of the clinical investigation,
the degree of information saturation present and how standardized
the presentation is.
In a discussion resonating with Sanati’s [29], Laura Guidry-
Grimes turns to disability studies and disability activism to argue
for a more rigorous incorporation of the subjective perspectives of
individuals with psychiatric disability into clinical reasoning
models [34]. Guidry-Grimes’ argument hinges on ethical issues of
autonomy and agency in the context of psychiatric disability.
Given that many individuals with a psychiatric condition have full
capacity to form stable commitments, preferences and interests
and are thus able to care about their disabled condition, Guidry-
Grimes suggests that there is a prima facie duty to respect and trust
their claims about valued aspects of their condition. This presents
potentially radical challenges to typical biomedical conceptions of
illness and health and expands the conversation to disability in
general and the way in which health care recognizes, evaluates and
accommodates difference in a variety of forms.
Oleksandr Dubov looks at rhetorical strategies in the patient–
physician interaction and examines the ethical issues at stake in
expanding this communication beyond appeals to reason to
encompass persuasive appeals to the emotions [35]. Although
tracing this strategy back to Aristotle, Dubov’s examination ben-
efits from a more modern understanding of decision making as a
process (contra Descartes) that always involves emotional process-
ing. From a practical standpoint this is observed in the wide range
of rhetorical styles observed in discussions regarding code/DNR
status. Given physicians’ clear ability to influence patient decision
making through the emotional inflections of their messages, this
raises interesting ethical questions surrounding when this tech-
nique is permissible or even indicated. Although Dubov focuses
primarily on how emotional tone can influence information deliv-
ery (and hence disposition to act on the part of the patient), the
paper raises interesting questions about the role of emotion in
individual clinician decision-making processes.
Greg Mahr’s paper ‘Narrative Medicine and Decision Making
Capacity’ [36] provides an interesting exploration of an alterna-
tive model of capacity assessment that draws from narrative
medicine. Mahr identifies limitations of typical capacity assess-
ments and suggests alterations informed by narrative medicine
that better capture the clinical encounter as a multilayered inter-
action between equally valid (and possibly conflicting) narra-
tives. The issues at stake here are practical and cognitive, as well
as ethical. Mahr’s paper indirectly expands on several themes
raised by Guidry-Grimes and Dubov [34,35], both in terms of the
relative weight given to patients’ subjective reports in assessment
and decision-making processes, but also the degree to which cli-
nicians should feel ethically justified in rhetorically bolstering
their clinical narrative.
Anthony Fernandez and Sarah Wieten’s paper ‘Values-Based
Practice and Phenomenological Psychopathology: Implications of
Existential Changes in Depression’ [37] argues that values-based
practice (VBP) as currently understood does not adequately
account for the subjective existential changes that take place in
patients with certain severe psychiatric conditions, such as major
depressive disorder. Their argument is that VBP, while represent-
ing a useful expansion of EBM to incorporate patient values, does
not do justice to the fact that the very act of valuing can be
fundamentally altered by an illness such as depression.
Given that depression is often characterized symptomatically by
degradation in the capacity to find meaning, connection or value,
VBP as it currently stands is unable to account for these implica-
tions. The authors propose several modifications to VBP to better
incorporate this phenomenon. Their work here also indirectly
addresses what has been described by Nancy Andreasen and others
as ‘the loss of phenomenology’ within American biological psy-
chiatry [38]. With the advent of DSM-based operationalized
symptom clusters to guide diagnosis, there has been a dramatic
decrease in descriptive, phenomenological characterizations of
mental illness – not only in terms of assessment but also in terms
of subjective character. Given the inherent limitations of current
day objective assessment in psychiatry, with incompletely charac-
terized biological underpinnings, this loss is even more acute.
Lloyd Wells’ paper ‘Clinical Thinking in Psychiatry’ [39] turns
our discussion towards the associated pedagogical issues at stake.
Clinical reasoning is poorly defined: it is not simply critical think-
ing, nor simply EBM, nor what Wells describes as ‘eminence-
based medicine’ but incorporates elements of all of the above. One
wants to do it well and, in turn, teach others to do it well. Given
limitations in our own understanding of what clinical reasoning
entails or should entail, how should we best impart this knowledge
to students?
The selected papers in this issue address unique challenges in
clinical reasoning involved in mental health fields as well as
broader issues in health care and education. Although there are
many interesting facets to this topic, as well as distinct local
variations depending on speciality, we hope that the sampling
provided here offers ample introduction to the spectrum of philo-
sophical, methodological and ethical challenges involved in char-
acterizing clinical reasoning.
Debates
The debates section of this thematic issue contains three direct
responses to papers in last year’s anniversary edition. In the phi-
losophy section of that edition, Susanna Every-Palmer and Jeremy
Howick argued that EBM is failing in its mission through industry
contamination of research [40]. In reply, Peter Wyer and Suzana
Alves Silva accuse the authors of failing to define that mission,
noting that the foundational papers they cite to define what EBM
‘is’ and ‘does’ do not contain any ‘actionable mission’ [41]. Wyer
and Silva note that as an educational movement, ‘EBM accom-
plished its mission to simplify and package clinical epidemiologi-
cal concepts in a form accessible to clinical learners’ and they
accuse Every-Palmer and Howick of failing ‘to distinguish
between the EBM movement and the research enterprise it was
developed to critique’. They speculate that this confusion may be
an outcome of the development of the term ‘EBM’ into a ‘gener-
alized packaging label’ associated with ‘levels of policy, health
care management and implementation’ that had nothing to do with
the movement’s initial educative project. We suspect that Every-
Palmer and Howick might actually agree with several of the points
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their critics make, and look forward to their robust response in the
debates section of the next thematic edition of this journal.
Staying with the theme of EBM, Eivind Engebretsen and col-
leagues [42] respond to a challenge raised by Jeanette Hofmeijer in
a paper published in the anniversary edition of this journal [43].
The authors agree with Hofmeijer that EBM involves a significant
amount of interpretation, at all levels. In particular, although pro-
ponents of EBM have admitted the challenges of integrating many
sources of evidence with patient values in a clinical decision,
guidance on this process has been lacking. Engebretsen and col-
leagues aim to pry open the black box of interpretation and expose
the principles of reasoning involved in the integration of different
sources of evidence (experimental and experiential) in clinical
decisions. They draw upon Bernard Lonergan’s epistemology for
these principles, which stresses the importance of self-awareness
and self-conscious questioning throughout the process of clinical
decision making.
In the final contribution to this section, Veli-Pekka Parkkinen
and Anders Strand continue an ongoing debate with Roger Kerry
and colleagues about the nature of causation in EBM [44]. Kerry
et al. have proposed that evidence-based practice should adopt a
dispositionalist view of causality [45,46]. In reply, Parkkinen and
Strand advocate for the ‘difference making’ view criticized by
Kerry et al. [47,48], focusing in particular on the support that such
a view gives for understanding the role that assumptions about
causality play in inferences made in clinical reasoning. Here, they
build on this argument to discuss predictions made across different
causal contexts and predictions about individual patients that are
made on the basis of evidence from RCTs. We are delighted that
the philosophy thematic editions of this journal have been host to
this important, meticulous and intellectually serious discussion,
and we hope that the contributors from each side will continue to
educate us and our readers in further exchanges.
Book reviews
The edition contains two book reviews. Tim Kenealy reviews
Nicholas Maxwell’s How Universities Can Help Create a Wiser
World: The Urgent Need for an Academic Revolution [49].
Maxwell provocatively appeals to universities to re-invent them-
selves to create a wiser world. Specifically, states Maxwell, uni-
versities need to re-orient their role from ‘knowledge inquiry’ to
‘wisdom inquiry’. Maxwell believes that this shift will yield prac-
tical solutions to enhance life. Kenealy agrees on the worthiness of
Maxwell’s aim, mindful of ‘an inappropriately narrow view of
knowledge and evidence in most institutions and in some disci-
plines’. However, Kenealy warns that Maxwell comes up short on
suggesting how to refocus universities, and he questions whether
knowledge inquiry is really to blame for current world crises. To
provide a more nuanced critique of Maxwell’s book, Kenealy
considers how scholarly service might shape four overlapping
functions of wisdom inquiry, namely discovery, integration, appli-
cation and teaching.
Sarah Weiten provides a detailed and largely very positive
review of Mona Gupta’s recent book Is Evidence-Based Psychia-
try Ethical [50]? The heart of the book, according to Weiten, is the
third chapter in which Gupta provides her answer to the question
that forms the title of the book. In doing so, Gupta exposes the
serious problems that arise when people apply EBM in psychiatric
care. Gupta also advances a fascinating argument about the utili-
tarian underpinnings of EBM near the end of the book. Not every-
thing is perfect, though: Weiten questions Gupta’s choice of
representative texts on EBM, worrying that they are not recent or
dynamic enough to represent EBM today, and raises worries about
the role of authority figures in portraying the movement, given
commitments to anti-authoritarianism in original formulations of
EBM.
Conference reports
We conclude with an extremely detailed account of the exchanges
and arguments presented in an interdisciplinary workshop in the
philosophy of medicine, hosted by the Centre for Humanities and
Health at King’s College London [51]. Philosophers Emma
Bullock, Tania Gergel and Elselijn Kingma provide a thorough and
insightful report on exchanges between practitioners, philoso-
phers, psychologists, legal theorists and social scientists on the
topic of ‘parentalism and trust’, featuring debates under the head-
ings ‘capacity and supported decision making’, ‘epistemic justice
and medical parentalism’, ‘trust and the doctor–patient relation-
ship’ and ‘public health policy and parentalism’.
The resonances between these discussions and the arguments of
the contributors to this, thematic edition of the Journal of Evalu-
ation in Clinical Practice, are striking. Although we are still far
from agreement on the precise map of the intellectual territory
covered in these exchanges, there is a growing sense of progress
and shared understandings regarding the nature of the problems
that face us and the possible ways forward if we are to resolve
them. In part, these problems concern diseases, the patients that
bear diseases and the knowledge-wielding providers that care for
patients. These three elements represent the corners of the Hippo-
cratic triangle [52]. One role of the philosophy of medicine is to
resolve the edges that connect these three points, a venerable task
towards which the articles in this special issue have no doubt
contributed.
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